Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. ___ (2025) (2025)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject toformal revision before publication in the United States Reports.Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, SupremeCourt of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formalerrors.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 23–825_________________SALVATORE DELLIGATTI, PETITIONER v.UNITED STATESon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the second circuit[March 21, 2025]Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of theCourt.Title 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(A)defines a “crime of violence” to include a felony that involves the“use of physical force” against another person. In the context of aclosely related statute, we have held that “the knowing orintentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the useof physical force.” United States v. Castleman,572 U.S.157, 169 (2014). This case asks whether that principle extendsto §924(c)(3)(A) and, if so, whether the principle holds in caseswhere an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather thanaction. We answer both questions in the affirmative.IASection 924(c) subjects any person who uses orcarries a firearm during or in relation to a “crime of violence” toa mandatory minimum sentence of five years, to be servedconsecutively with any other term of imprisonment.§§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (D)(ii). By the terms of the statute, afederal felony qualifies as a predicate crime of violence if itfalls within either of two provisions. Under the first provision,known as the elements clause, an offense qualifies if it “has as anelement the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical forceagainst the person or property of another.” §924(c)(3)(A). Underthe second provision, known as the residual clause, an offensequalifies if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk thatphysical force against the person or property of another may beused in the course of committing the offense.” §924(c)(3)(B). InUnited States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), thisCourt held that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.Id., at 470.This Court applies a “categorical approach” todetermine whether an offense falls within the elements clause.United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 850 (2022).Under that approach, we do not examine the defendant’s actualconduct. Instead, we ask whether the offense in question “always”involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.Ibid. If the offense can be committed without the use,attempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime ofviolence under the elements clause.BSalvatore Delligatti is an associate of theGenovese crime family, one of the New York Mafia’s so-called FiveFamilies. In 2014, a local gas station owner hired Delligatti tokill Joseph Bonelli, a “neighborhood bully” and suspected policeinformant. United States v. Pastore, 83 F. 4th 113,117 (CA2 2023). Delligatti recruited several members of a streetgang to carry out the job and provided them with a car and a loadedrevolver. The gang members drove to Bonelli’s house while he wasout, intending to shoot him when he returned. They abandoned thisplan, however, after seeing too many potential witnesses. AtDelligatti’s urging, the gang members returned the following day totry again. But, by this time, the police had discovered the plotand arrested the gang members on their way to carry out thehit.The Government charged Delligatti with severaloffenses, including one count of using or carrying a firearm duringor in relation to a “crime of violence” under §924(c). Theindictment charged as a predicate crime of violence attemptedmurder under the violent-crimes-in-aid-of- racketeering (VICAR)statute, 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(5). VICAR attempted murderrequires proof that the defendant committed an underlying state orfederal offense that constitutes attempted “murder.” Ibid.The Government alleged that Delligatti met this requirement byattempting second-degree murder under New York law. A personcommits second-degree murder when, “[w]ith intent to cause thedeath of another person, he causes the death of such person or of athird person.” N.Y. Penal Law Ann. §125.25(1) (West2009).Before trial, Delligatti moved to dismiss his§924(c) charge on the ground that the Government had not alleged avalid predicate crime of violence. The District Court denied themotion, holding that there “can be no serious argument” that VICARattempted murder is not a crime of violence. App. to Pet. for Cert.40a–41a. A jury convicted Delligatti on all counts, and theDistrict Court sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals forthe Second Circuit, Delligatti argued that a VICAR offensepredicated on New York second-degree murder falls outside §924(c)’selements clause. Homicide under New York law can be committed byact or omission, with the latter defined as a failure toperform a legally imposed duty. N.Y. Penal Law Ann.§§15.00(3), 15.10 (West 2009); People v. Steinberg,79 N.Y.2d 673, 680, 595 N.E.2d 845, 847 (1992). Thus, for example,a parent who intentionally causes his child’s death by withholdingfood or medical care commits second-degree murder under New Yorklaw. See People v. Best, 202 App. Div. 2d 1015,1015–1016, 609 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (1994). Delligatti argued thatomission-based crimes like these do not involve the “use offorce.”While Delligatti’s appeal was pending, theSecond Circuit rejected his position in a different case. Relyingon our decision in Castleman, it held that the“‘knowing or intentional causation of bodily injurynecessarily involves the use of physical force,’” evenwhen the defendant causes harm “by omission.” United Statesv. Scott, 990 F.3d 94, 111, 114 (2021) (en banc) (quoting572 U.S., at 169, and adding emphasis). ApplyingScott, the Second Circuit held in Delligatti’s case that NewYork attempted second-degree murder—and, by extension, a VICARoffense predicated on it—is a crime of violence because itnecessarily involves at least the attempted use of force. 83 F.4th, at 121–122.[1]We granted certiorari to decide whether anindividual who knowingly or intentionally causes bodily injury ordeath by failing to take action uses physical force within themeaning of the elements clause. 602 U.S. ___ (2024).[2]IIThe Second Circuit correctly held that causingbodily harm by omission requires the use of force. As inCastleman, the “use” of “physical force” in §924(c)encompasses the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury.There is no exception to this principle when an offender causesbodily injury by omission rather than affirmative act. Delligatti’s§924(c) challenge therefore fails.ACastleman establishes that understatutes like the one at issue here it is impossible todeliberately cause physical harm without the use of physical force.Although Castleman addressed a different statute, weconclude that its holding extends to §924(c).1Section922(g)(9), the statute at issuein Castleman, prohibits anyone convicted of “a misdemeanorcrime of domestic violence” from owning a firearm. As under§924(c)’s elements clause, an offense qualifies under thisprovision if, along with other criteria, it “has, as an element,the use ... of physical force.” §921(a)(33)(A). Thequestion presented in Castleman was whether an offense for“‘intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury’”met that description. 572 U.S., at 161. The District Courthad held that it was possible to commit the offense without the useof force, because the offense encompassed deceiving someone“‘into drinking a poisoned beverage.’” Id., at170. We disagreed. Our reasoning proceeded in two steps.First, we found it “impossible to cause bodilyinjury without applying force” in the sense relevant here.Ibid. (emphasis added). Section 922(g)(9), we held,encompasses the kind and “degree of force that supports acommon-law battery conviction.” Id., at 168. That “conceptof ‘force’” includes causing bodily harm indirectly, such as“‘by administering a poison or by infecting with a disease,or even by resort to some intangible substance,’ such as a laserbeam.” Id., at 170 (quoting 2 W. LaFave, SubstantiveCriminal Law §16.2(b) (2d ed. 2003)).Second, we held that “the knowing or intentionalapplication of force is a ‘use’ of force” under theprovision in question. 572 U.S., at 170 (emphasis added). Aperson uses force in that sense when he makes force his“instrument,” whether directly or indirectly. Id., at170–171 (internal quotation marks omitted). So, for example, when aperson “sprinkles poison in a victim’s drink,” he uses force by“employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm,”even though “the act of sprinkling” does not itself involve force.Id., at 171 (alteration and internal quotation marksomitted). Thus, whenever someone knowingly causes physical harm, heuses force within the meaning of §922(g)(9).2The logic of Castleman extends to§924(c). Both §922(g)(9) and §924(c) cover offenses involving the“use” of “physical force.” To be sure, these two provisionsarguably use the term “physical force” to require different levelsof force—battery-level force for §922(g)(9) and violent force for§924(c).[3] But, because bothbattery-level force and violent force may be applied indirectly,that difference is immaterial here.In Castleman, Justice Scalia wrote anopinion concurring in the judgment observing that deliberatelycausing injury necessarily involves the use of both battery-leveland violent force. The Castleman majority held that becauseof §922(g)(9)’s particular focus on misdemeanor crimes ofdomestic violence, the phrase “use of physical force” inthat statute requires only battery-level force, which can besatisfied by “‘even the slightest offensive touching.’”Id., at 160–168. The majority thereby distinguishedJohnson v. United States, 559U.S. 133 (2010), where this Court had held that the same phrasein the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)required a higher showing of “violent force—that is, theforce capable of causing physical pain or injury to anotherperson.” Id., at 140; see 18 U.S.C.§924(e)(2)(B)(i). Justice Scalia disagreed, concluding that§922(g)(9) requires violent force. Castleman, 572U.S., at 175 (opinion concurring in part and concurring injudgment). But, he made clear that this point of disagreement didnot affect the outcome of that case. He explained thatintentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury “categoricallyinvolves the use of ‘force capable of causing physical pain orinjury to another person.’” Ibid. (quotingJohnson, 559 U.S., at 140). And, “for the reasonsgiven by the Court,” that is so even when the defendant “cause[s]bodily injury through deceit or other nonviolent means.” 572U.S., at 175, n.1 (opinion of Scalia, J.).[4]Justice Scalia’s view of violent forceeventually garnered a majority. In Stokeling v. UnitedStates, 586 U.S. 73 (2019), we held that violent forceencompasses “the ‘force’ required for common-law robbery,” which is“the quintessential ACCA-predicate crime.” Id., at 80.Common-law robbery requires only the force needed to overcome thevictim’s slightest physical resistance, even if it results in“minimal pain or injury.” Id., at 78, 83–84. Thus, although“‘the merest touching’” is not violent force, any forcethat actually causes injury or death is. Id., at 83 (quotingJohnson, 559 U.S., at 139). We therefore concluded inStokeling that Justice Scalia’s “understanding of ‘physicalforce’” in Castleman was “consistent with ourholding.” 586 U.S., at 85.By pegging “physical force” to robbery,Stokeling makes clear that even the indirect causation ofbodily harm requires the use of violent force. This principle waswell established when Congress enacted §924(c)’s elements clause in1986. 100Stat. 456–457. As one contemporaneous treatise put it,“[j]ust as battery may be committed by the administration ofpoison, so the force used to obtain property from a person againsthis will may be applied internally.” R. Perkins & R. Boyce,Criminal Law 348 (3d ed. 1982) (footnote deleted); see alsoPeople v. Dreas, 153 Cal. App. 3d 623, 627–629, 200 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 (1984); Carroll v. State,440 So. 2d 343, 344–345 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Peoplev. Berryman, 43 Mich. App. 366, 367–368, 204 N.W.2d 238, 239(1972); State v. Skillings, 98 N.H. 203, 207,97 A.2d 202, 205 (1953); State v. Snyder, 41 Nev.453, 456–459, 172 P. 364, 364–365 (1918); 2 W. LaFave & A.Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §8.11(d)(1), p.447 (1986)(LaFave & Scott); 4 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law §479,p.67 (14th ed. 1981) (Wharton).Delligatti resists extending Castleman’slogic to §924(c). He argues there cannot be an “automaticconnection” between injury and the violent force §924(c)requires because even a small degree of force might injure an“eggshell” victim. Brief for Petitioner 37–38. But, as we held inStokeling, the minimal force needed to overcome theresistance of “a feeble or weak-willed victim” still qualifies assufficiently “violent” to fall within the statute’s ambit. 586U.S., at 83. Delligatti also concedes that it is possible touse violent force “indirectly,” Brief for Petitioner 7, as when aperson tricks another into eating food that has aged to the pointof becoming toxic, Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. Thus, the “knowing orintentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the useof physical force” under §924(c) just as it does under §922(g)(9).Castleman, 572 U.S., at 169.BCastleman’s logic foreclosesDelligatti’s challenge. Deliberately causing injury necessarilyinvolves the use of force in the sense relevant here. Under NewYork law, second-degree murder requires proof that the defendantintentionally “cause[d] the death of another person.” N.Y.Penal Law Ann. §125.25(1). And, it should go without saying,intentionally causing death counts as deliberately causing injury.Thus, second-degree murder in New York—and, by extension,Delligatti’s VICAR offense premised on it—is a crime of violenceunder §924(c)’s elements clause.Delligatti disagrees. He insists that New Yorksecond-degree murder falls outside Castleman’s rule becausea person can commit the offense through omission of a legal duty.Steinberg, 79 N.Y. 2d, at 680, 595 N.E. 2d, at847; supra, at 3. In such cases, Delligatti contends, thelaw may deem the offender the cause of the victim’s deaththrough “legal fiction,” but that fiction is not enough to make theperson the “actual cause.” Reply Brief 7. That is incorrect. Wehave explained that the test for “actual causality” is whether thevictim’s death “would not have occurred in the absence of—that is,but for—the defendant’s conduct.” Burrage v. UnitedStates, 571 U.S.204, 211 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). When ayoung child starves to death after his parents refuse to give himfood, that harm would not have occurred but for the parents’choice. Both in the eyes of the law and as a practical matter, theparents’ conduct is no less a cause of the child’s death than ifthe parents had poisoned him.Unable to escape Castleman’s reach,Delligatti argues in the alternative that its rule is unsound asapplied to omissions. An offender who causes harm by omission, thetheory goes, does not make “use” of physical force “against theperson ... of another.” §924(c)(3)(A). Again, wedisagree.It is perfectly natural to say that a personmakes “use” of something by deliberate inaction. A car owner, forexample, can “use” the rain to wash his vehicle simply by leavingit parked on the street. And, a fugitive can “use” the cover ofdarkness to hide by lying still at night. In the same way, a motherwho purposely kills her child by declining to intervene when thechild finds bleach and starts drinking it makes “use” of thebleach’s poisonous properties to accomplish her unlawful end. And,a husband who deliberately abandons his wife to die in the cold“use[s] th[e] forces” of “the elements” to cause her death.Territory v. Manton, 7 Mont. 162, 168, 14 P. 637,638–639 (1887). Delligatti’s proposed action-inaction distinctionhas no basis in ordinary meaning.Similarly, we reject the argument that thephrase “against another” excludes crimes of omission. At most, thatphrase requires that another person be “the conscious object” ofthe force the offender uses. Borden v. United States,593 U.S. 420, 430 (2021) (plurality opinion). Put differently, thelanguage “against another” specifies the required object of theforce (another person, rather than, say, an animal), and possiblyalso the mens rea with which the object must be targeted(knowingly or intentionally, rather than negligently orrecklessly). Id., at 430–434.[5] Whenever an offender deliberately causes bodily harm byomission, he necessarily makes another person the conscious objectof physical force. In the bleach example, the mother’s refusal totake away the bleach is not an accident, but rather a deliberateeffort to make the child suffer the bleach’s poisonous effects. Themother thus uses force against her child. It would bepassing strange to say the mother used force to cause the child’sdeath, but did not use force against anyone.Context also confirms that crimes of omissionfall within the elements clause. The elements clause is adefinition of the term “crime of violence.” §924(c)(3). Whenchoosing among interpretations of a statutory definition, the“ordinary meaning” of the “defined term” is an important contextualclue. Bond v. United States, 572U.S. 844, 861 (2014). Thus, we prefer interpretations of theelements clause that encompass prototypical “crimes of violence”over those that do not. See Stokeling, 586 U.S., at81–82; Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 696(2016); Castleman, 572 U.S., at 167.Intentional murder is the prototypical“crime of violence,” and it has long been understood to incorporateliability for both act and omission. At the time of the elementsclause’s enactment, it was widely accepted that one could commitmurder by refusing to perform a legal duty, like feeding one’schild. See, e.g., Lackey v. State, 246Ga. 331, 331–332, 336, 271 S.E.2d 478, 480–481, 483 (1980); State v.Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 61–63 (Utah 1978) (percuriam);People v. Burden, 72 Cal. App. 3d 603, 616–619, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 289–291(1977); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 20–21,141 S.E.2d 710, 714–715 (1965); State v. Shephard,255 Iowa 1218, 1232–1235, 124 N.W.2d 712, 720–722 (1963); 1 LaFave & Scott §3.3, at282–283. As the Government notes, this view had deep roots in thecommon law. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. ofHealth, 497 U.S.261, 297 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (collectingauthorities); Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523,527–528, 78 N.E.2d 644, 647 (1948) (same); 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas ofthe Crown §8, p.79 (1716); Brief for United States 23–26.Moreover, murder was not the only violent crimethat States recognized could arise from omission. Knowingly causingnonlethal injury to one’s child by neglect, for example, couldamount to common-law battery. See, e.g.,People v. Bernard, 149 Ill. App. 3d 684, 693–695, 500N.E.2d 1074, 1079–1080 (1986); State v. Walden, 306N.C. 466, 476, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786–787 (1982); 1 LaFave & Scott §3.3(e),at 294. In 1986, at least 33 States had statutes generally definingcriminally culpable acts to include omission of a legal duty. SeeBrief for United States 27–28, n.3. Leading criminal-lawtreatises similarly equated act and omission. 1 LaFave & Scott§3.3, at 282–283; 1 Wharton §25, at 116–120 (1978); see also ALI,Model Penal Code §1.13(7), p.209 (1985) (“acted” “includes,where relevant, ‘omitted to act’”).Thus, we cannot adopt Delligatti’sinterpretation without excluding traditional and widely accepteddefinitions of murder and other prototypical violent crimes fromthe elements clause’s reach. If the elements clause is to have areasonable relationship to the term it defines, it must encompasscases where the offender makes use of physical force by deliberateinaction. To the extent any doubt remains that Congress meant forthe elements clause to cover crimes of omission, the ordinarymeaning of “crime of violence” resolves it.Delligatti insists that his position—that murderis not a crime of violence—is not as outlandish as it sounds.Congress, he tells us, expected crimes like his to fall within thenow-defunct residual clause. See §924(c)(3)(B) (covering offensesthat involve “a substantial risk that physical force... may be used”). But, to say that killing someoneinvolves a “risk” of force is a gross understatement in ordinaryspeech, rendering the residual clause at best an awkward fit. Theelements clause is thus the natural home for murder and otherprototypical violent crimes, and the unreasonableness of excludingsuch crimes from the elements clause is an “additional reason toread the statute as we do.” Castleman, 572 U.S., at167.CThe dissent’s arguments fare no better thanDelligatti’s. The dissent asserts that the use of physical forcerequires “a violent or extreme physical act” rather than “meretouching or pre-existing natural forces.” Post, at 4(opinion of Gorsuch, J.). In other words, disagreeing with JusticeScalia, the dissent maintains that many ways of causing bodily harmindirectly, such as deceiving the victim or slipping poison intohis drink, do not involve the use of violent force. Post, at4–5, n.1; see Castleman, 572 U.S., at 175,n.1 (opinion of Scalia, J.). This view runs headlong intoStokeling’s holding that violent force encompasses “the‘force’ required for common-law robbery.” 586 U.S., at 80.Common-law robbery is a crime that may be committed indirectly,supra, at 8, such as by slipping a sedative into thevictim’s coffee, Dreas, 153 Cal. App. 3d, at 627, 200 Cal.Rptr., at 589. Thus, no violent or extreme physical act is neededto use force within the meaning of the elements clause. Not evenDelligatti disagrees with that basic proposition. See supra,at 8.The dissent suggests that, in any event,criminal statutes do not cover omissions absent express language tothat effect. Post, at 6–7. No such clear-statement ruleexists. Many crimes “may be committed either by affirmative actionor by failure to act” even though they are not “specifically sodefined.” 1 LaFave & Scott §3.3, at 282; see supra, at11–12. New York’s second-degree murder statute is a prime example.It prohibits intentionally “caus[ing] the death of another person”without explicitly mentioning omissions. N.Y. Penal Law Ann.§125.25(1). But, because one can cause death by omission, thestatute covers omissions. Supra, at 3. So too here, becauseone can make “use of physical force” against another by omission,§924(c)(3)(A), the elements clause covers omissions.Nor do any of our precedents establish that, inthe context of the elements clause, it is impossible to “use” forceby omission. Contra, post, at 9–10. In Bailey v.United States, 516 U.S.137 (1995), this Court explained that the word “use” means“‘[t]o convert to one’s service,’ ‘to employ,’ ‘to availoneself of,’ and ‘to carry out a purpose or action by meansof.’” Id., at 145. Thus, the “mere possession of afirearm” during a crime does not amount to a “use” of the firearmunder §924(c) if the wrongdoer does not employ the firearm toaccomplish his criminal end. Id., at 143; see alsoVoisine, 579 U.S., at 692–693, and n.3(reiterating Bailey’s interpretation of “use”);Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S.1, 9 (2004) (same). In contrast, a mother who lets her childdrink bleach because she wants him to die uses the force ofthe bleach within the meaning of the elements clause because sheaccomplishes her purpose by means of the bleach’s harmful effects.And, by targeting a particular individual, the mother has taken a“specific actio[n] against [a] specific perso[n],” not merely“pose[d] an abstract risk to community peace and order.”Taylor, 596 U.S., at 856. As a matter of both text andprecedent, deliberately causing injury or death by omission is ause of physical force.Finally, the dissent takes issue with ourreliance on the ordinary meaning of “crime of violence,” brandingit an impermissible “resort to unexpressed legislative intentions.”Post, at 14. To the contrary, we engage in the standard taskof reading a statutory definition in light of the conventionalmeaning of the term it defines. “Since on this side of thelooking-glass an entirely artificial definition is rare, themeaning of the definition is almost always closely related to theordinary meaning of the word being defined.” A. Scalia & B.Garner, Reading Law 228 (2012). Thus, when the meaning of theelements clause “is not clear,” the ordinary meaning of the term“crime of violence” is one of “the most important” factors we canconsider. Ibid.*  *  *The knowing or intentional causation of injuryor death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the useof physical force against another person. The judgment of the Courtof Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed.It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 23–825_________________SALVATORE DELLIGATTI, PETITIONER v.UNITED STATESon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the second circuit[March 21, 2025]Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Jacksonjoins, dissenting.Imagine a lifeguard perched on his chair at thebeach who spots a swimmer struggling against the waves. Instead ofleaping into action, the lifeguard chooses to settle back in hischair, twirl his whistle, and watch the swimmer slip away. Thelifeguard may know that his inaction will cause death. Perhaps theswimmer is the lifeguard’s enemy and the lifeguard even wishes tosee him die. Either way, the lifeguard is a bad man. In manyStates, he may be guilty of a serious crime for failing to fulfillhis legal duty to help the swimmer. But does the lifeguard’soffense also qualify under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(A) as a“crime of violence” involving the “use... ofphysical force against the person... of another”?The Court thinks so. I do not. Section 924(c)(3)(A) may reach manycrimes, but it does not reach crimes of omission.IAAs I see it, the Court reaches the wrongdestination because it takes a wrong turn at the start. Our casesare replete with reminders that, when faced with a question ofstatutory interpretation, the text is where we must begin (andoften end). Today, however, the Court whistles past the termsCongress gave us in §924(c)(3)(A). Instead, it chooses to begin(and largely end) its analysis of this case with an examination ofprecedent and assumptions about congressional purposes.Ante, at 5–13. I will get to those matters later. But first,let’s do what the Court does not and look to the text.Section 924(c)(1) imposes a sentencingenhancement on individuals who “us[e],” “carr[y],” or “posses[s]”firearms “during and in relation to” a “crime of violence.” Seeante, at 1–2. Section 924(c)(3)(A) then proceeds to definethe phrase “crime of violence” as “an offense that is a felony and... has as an element the use, attempted use, orthreatened use of physical force against the person or property ofanother.”Today, the Court reworks that definition at thegovernment’s request. Now, the Court says, a “crime of violence”includes “the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury... by omission.” Ante, at 4. Under thatapproach, the government admits, even our lifeguard, whose offensestems from inaction, is guilty of a “crime of violence.” Tr. ofOral Arg. 51. The only trouble is, nothing like the rule thegovernment proposes and the Court adopts appears anywhere in§924(c).To appreciate how unlikely the Court’s new ruleis, just walk through the statute’s key definitional terms,beginning with the word “use.” When Congress adopted the currentversion of §924(c) in 1984, the word “use” meant, as it does today,“to employ,” “to convert to one’s service,” or “to avail one’s selfof.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1381 (def. 1) (5th ed. 1979); see alsoWebster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 2012 (def. 1) (2d ed.1983) (similar). As this Court has long recognized, “[t]hesevarious definitions of ‘use’ imply action.” Bailey v.United States, 516 U.S.137, 145 (1995); see also Voisine v. UnitedStates, 579 U.S. 686, 692–693, and n.3 (2016) (collectingcases). And because “use” has an “active meaning,” one does not“use” something through mere “inacti[on],” “inert[ia],” or“nonactiv[ity].” Bailey, 516 U.S., at 148–149.What must a person actively employ to commit acrime of violence? The statute tells us: “physical force.”§924(c)(3)(A). That is, “[f]orce applied to the body; actualviolence.” Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1032. This Court explained asmuch in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.133 (2010). There, the Court addressed the meaning ofthe phrase “physical force” in the definition of the term “violentfelony” in §924(e). “[P]hysical force,” the Court held, does notreach “emotional” or “intellectual” force. Id., at 138. Nordoes it carry its “specialized meaning in the field of physics: acause of the acceleration of mass.” Id., at 138–139. Soletting a pre-existing force of nature run its course does notsuffice. Instead, an individual must employ “[f]orce consisting ina physical act.” Id., at 139.The “physical act” must also be a violent one.Again, consider Johnson. Because §924(e) uses the phrase“physical force” to define what qualifies as a “violent felony,”the Court in Johnson rejected the government’s effort toequate the “physical act” required by the statute with the kind of“mer[e] touching” sufficient to establish the common-law crime ofbattery. Id., at 139. Resort to common-law batteryprinciples in this statutory scheme, the Court reasoned, wouldproduce “a comical misfit.” Id., at 145. Instead, the Courtruled, the requisite “physical act” must be “violent,” whichis to say “extreme” and “severe.” Id., at 140. And if thatmuch follows when the phrase “physical force” is used to define a“violent felony” in §924(e), surely the same must hold true whenthe same phrase is used in the same section of the U.S. Codeto define a “felony” “crime of violence.” §924(c); see Azarv. Allina Health Services, 587 U.S. 566, 574 (2019).Finally, the statute requires the use of force“against the person or property of another.” Again addressing§924(e), a plurality of this Court has recognized that similarlanguage modifies the “volitional conduct (i.e., theuse of force)” discussed in the statute, and in doing so identifiesthe “conscious object” of a defendant’s “use of physical force.”Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 431 (2021).All of which suggests that the statute before us captures onlyactive violent force when it is knowingly or intentionally appliedagainst the person or property of another. See id., at431–432.Putting these pieces together reveals theimplausibility of the Court’s new rule. To commit a “crime ofviolence,” an individual must (1) actively (not just throughinertia) employ (2) a violent or extreme physical act (not a meretouching or pre-existing natural forces) (3) knowingly orintentionally to harm another person or his property. An individualwho, as the Court puts it, “causes bodily injury by omission” doesnot begin to meet these criteria. Ante, at 4. Someone likeour lifeguard may knowingly or intentionally cause another’s deathby refusing to fulfill his legal duty to act. Maliciously, he maychoose to allow natural forces to take their toll. But by remainingin his chair, he does not actively employ even the merest touching,let alone violent physical force. Of course, crimes of omissionlike our lifeguard’s are serious ones that can invite seriouspunishments under various state and federal laws. But §924(c)(3)(A)was not written to reach every felony found in our Nation’s manycriminal codes. And the statute’s terms simply cannot be stretchedto cover crimes of “inact[ion],” “inert[ia],” or “nonacti[vity].”Bailey, 516 U.S., at 149.[1]BNot only does the Court fail to grapple withthe statutory text, it breezes past the next best evidence ofstatutory meaning: context. As it turns out, several pieces ofcontextual evidence, all unmentioned by the Court, weigh againstthe notion that a §924(c)(3)(A) “crime of violence” can include acrime of omission.First, consider how informed readers understoodthe phrase in 1981. When Congress first considered defining “crimeof violence” to require the “use of physical force against theperson or property of another,” legislators recognized that thoseterms would not reach omissions. S.Rep. No. 97–307,p.591 (1981). A Senate report explained that the “operator ofa dam [who] refuse[d] to open the floodgates during a flood,thereby placing the residents of an upstream area in jeopardy oftheir lives” would not commit a “crime of violence” since “he didnot ... use physical force.” Ibid. Of course,“legislative history is not the law” and should not be confused forit. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 523(2018). But the report supplies at least some evidence thatordinary speakers at the time of §924(c)(3)(A)’s enactmentunderstood the phrase “use... of physical force”to exclude crimes of omission. See A. Scalia & B. Garner,Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 388 (2012) (Scalia& Garner) (recognizing that courts may use legislative history“for the purpose of establishing linguistic usage”).Second, analyzing “how particular combinationsof words are used in a vast database of English prose” can shedlight on how ordinary people understand statutory terms. SeeFacebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395, 412 (2021)(Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Just such a database—theCorpus of Contemporary American English—contains “forty-sevennon-specialist instances of ‘use of physical force.’”United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94, 129, n.8(CA2 2021) (en banc) (Menashi, J., concurring in part andconcurring in judgment). Of those references, “all refer tophysical contact; none plausibly refer to ‘deriv[ing] service from’a preexisting physical force.” Ibid. Thus the phrase“prototypically refers to assertive physical contact—‘punches,kicks, slaps[,] and body slams.’” Id., at 129.Third, any other interpretation introducesredundancy into the statutory scheme. Section 924(c)(3) details twoseparate ways in which an offense may qualify as a “crime ofviolence.” The first, the focus of our attention, is found in§924(c)(3)(A), or what is sometimes called the elements clause.That provision addresses those felony offenses that have “as anelement the use ... of physical force against theperson or property of another.” The second, found in §924(c)(3)(B),or what is sometimes called the residual clause, speaks to felonyoffenses that “by [their] nature, involv[e] a substantial risk [of]physical force.” To the extent §924(c) might address omissionoffenses, the residual clause is their natural home. It requires noactive employment of physical force, only a risk some such forcemight be deployed. Expanding the elements clause to reach omissionoffenses, as the Court does today, goes a long way toward renderingthe residual clause pointless. Perhaps the Court considers thatoutcome a virtue, given that we have held the residual clauseunconstitutionally vague and thus unenforceable. UnitedStates v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 470 (2019). Butconscripting one subsection to do the work no longer performed byanother makes a hash of the separate and discrete provisions thatCongress enacted.Finally, a look to the broader federal criminalcode reinforces what the statutory text suggests. Congress hasexhibited no difficulty addressing omission crimes elsewhere,mentioning them explicitly in dozens of provisions up and down theU.S. Code. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §13(a) (“act oromission” is punishable); §542 (similar); §1166(b) (similar); 28U.S.C. §1346(b)(1) (similar). The fact that Congress“knows exactly” how to reach omission offenses “when it wishes” todo so, yet declined to mention them in 18 U.S.C.§924(c)(3)(A), stands as one more piece of evidence yet that thestatute covers only offenses involving the active use of force.Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U.S. 685, 704(2022).[2]CWhere does (or should) all this leave us? Todetermine whether a state offense qualifies as a crime of violenceunder the elements clause, a court must assess whether the offense“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use ofphysical force” against another. §924(c)(3)(A). That assessment“does not require—in fact, it precludes—an inquiry into how anyparticular defendant may commit the crime.” United States v.Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 850 (2022). Were it otherwise and asentencing judge could find facts about the defendant’s underlyingconduct, serious Sixth Amendment questions might follow. SeeErlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 833(2024).Now apply the elements clause’s test to the NewYork statute at issue before us. That law makes it a crimeintentionally “to cause the death of another.” N.Y. Penal LawAnn. §125.25(1) (West 2009); see also ante, at 4, andn.2. Doubtless, New York’s offense can be (and usually is)committed by affirmative actions involving the use of violentphysical force. But, the parties agree, New York’s offense canalso be committed by someone, like our lifeguard, whointentionally causes death by failing to fulfill a legal dutyrequiring him to act. Brief for Petitioner 18; Brief for UnitedStates 8. In cases like that, prosecutors can prevail simply byshowing that a defendant did nothing when he had a legalduty to do something. And because a defendant can beconvicted of the crime without proof that he used, attempted touse, or threatened to use physical force against anyone or anythingat all, New York’s offense cannot qualify as a crime of violenceunder §924(c)(3)(A).IIThe Court chafes at this conclusion. Itemphasizes that Mr. Delligatti committed no mere crime of omissionbut instead plotted to use active force against his victim.Ante, at 2–4. On that much, there is no room for dispute.But neither is there room to dispute that §924(c)(3)(A) focuses onthe elements of New York’s offense, not the particulars of Mr.Delligatti’s crime. Some have criticized this feature of theelements clause, and their voices “could hardly be louder.”United States v. Harris, 87 F.4th 195, 212, andn.25 (CA3 2023) (Jordan, J., concurring in denial ofrehearing en banc) (collecting criticisms). But no amount ofwishful thinking can change the nature of the inquiry that§924(c)(3)(A) demands. See Taylor, 596 U.S., at850.Ultimately, the Court acknowledges as much. ForNew York’s offense to qualify as a “crime of violence,” the Courtconcedes, it must find some way to explain how committing thatoffense by omission requires the government to prove, as anelement, the “use ... of physical force.” Ante,at 4, 8. To get there, the Court appeals to precedent, ante,at 5–10, and implicit congressional purposes, ante, at10–11. But, unsurprisingly, our precedents do not require us toignore the statute’s terms. And no amount of conjecture aboutimplicit congressional purposes can substitute for statutorytext.Start with the Court’s argument from precedent.The Court asks us to believe that its hands are tied by UnitedStates v. Castleman, 572 U.S.157 (2014), and Stokeling v. United States, 586U.S. 73 (2019). Those two cases, the Court insists, require us toconclude that knowingly or intentionally causing bodily injury byomission always “requires the use of force.” Ante, at 4. So,as the Court tells it, even if the statute’s terms might suggest adifferent result, respect for stare decisis compels theconclusion that New York’s statute satisfies the elements clause.Ibid.Notice, though, what’s missing from the Court’saccount of precedent. While training its attention onCastleman and Stokeling, the Court neglects so manyother relevant cases, relegating them to little more than anafterthought. Ante, at 13–14. Where is Bailey, andits holding that the term “use” in §924(c)(1) carries an “activemeaning,” implying “action and implementation,” not mere“inacti[on],” “inert[ia],” or “nonactivit[y]”? 516 U.S., at145–149. Where is our precedent holding that the same word in thesame law normally carries the same meaning—indicating that the term“use” in §924(c)(3)(A) should be read the same way? SeeAzar, 587 U.S., at 574. Where are our decisions inLeocal and Voisine, interpreting “use” in otheranalogous contexts to mean “active employment,” Leocal v.Ashcroft, 543 U.S.1, 9 (2004), or “volitional conduct,” Voisine, 579U.S., at 693? Where is Johnson’s conclusion that theterm “physical force” in §924(e) excludes “its specialized meaningin ... physics,” requires more than “the meresttouching,” and cannot be equated with the common law of battery?559 U.S., at 138–139. And where is Taylor’s admissionthat a “crime of violence” under §924(c) “[p]lainly ...requires the government to prove that the defendant took specificactions against specific persons or their property”? 596U.S., at 856. Viewing our precedents as a whole leaves littlequestion about how this case should come out. But, rather thanengage with so many inconvenient cases, the Court largely ignoresthem.Even examined in isolation, the two decisionsthe Court plucks out of the stack cannot begin to do the work theCourt seeks to impress upon them. Take Castleman first. Itinvolved §922(g), which prohibits anyone convicted of a“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from owning a firearm. Bystatute, Congress has defined the phrase “misdemeanor crime[s] ofdomestic violence” to reach certain offenses that have “as anelement, the ... use of physical force.”§921(a)(33)(A)(ii). The question for the Court was whether a statedomestic-assault statute making it a crime to “intentionally orknowingly caus[e] bodily injury” satisfied that definition. 572U.S., at 161. The Court held it did. Because §922(g)(9)focuses on misdemeanor crimes of violence, the Court reasoned, itrequires no more “physical force” than that required to establish abattery at common law—so “even the slightest offensive touching”will do. Ante, at 6 (quoting Castleman, 572U.S., at 160–168). And, the Court held, the state offense atissue met that standard because it required proof of “force in thecommon-law sense.” Id., at 170.Nothing in Castleman compels theconclusion that omission crimes involve “the use, attempted use, orthreatened use of physical force” sufficient to implicate§924(c)(3)(A). Cf. ante, at 5. In fact, Castleman didnot even discuss crimes of omission. And when the Courtspoke of what it means to “use physical force,” the Court spoke inactive terms, stressing that the “knowing or intentionalapplication of force is a ‘use’ of force.” 572 U.S.,at 170 (emphasis added). To be sure, the Court observed that adefendant may use physical force “indirectly, rather thandirectly.” Id., at 170–171. So, the Court explained, when adefendant “pull[s] the trigger on a gun,” the defendant usesphysical force even though the “bullet, not thetrigger,... strikes the victim.” Ibid. Butfrom that, it does not follow that a defendant “uses physicalforce” when he does nothing. Cf. ante, at 4–6. Someone likeour lifeguard stands worlds away from a shooter who indirectly“uses” a firearm’s explosive force when he pulls the trigger.To the extent Castleman has anything tosay about our case, it does more to hurt than to help the Court’scause. To reach its holding that common-law battery informs thedegree of physical force required by §922(g)(9), Castlemanhad to distinguish Johnson, where the Court held that thedegree of force associated with common-law battery does notqualify as the kind of “physical force” necessary to satisfy§924(e). 559 U.S., at 140; see Part I–A, supra. Todistinguish Johnson, Castleman stressed that§922(g)(9) addresses “misdemeanor crime[s] of domesticviolence,” while §924(e) focuses on “violent felon[ies].”572 U.S., at 163–164 (emphasis added). That difference, theCourt reasoned, indicates the two statutes demand different degreesof force. Id., at 164. Here, of course, we face a statutelike §924(e), one addressing felony crimes of violence, not meremisdemeanors. And if, as Johnson held and Castlemanrecognized, a mere touching is insufficient to satisfy §924(e)’s“physical force” requirement, it is hard to imagine how completeinaction might fit the bill under §924(c)(3)(A).With nothing in the Castleman majorityopinion to help it, the Court eventually turns to Justice Scalia’ssolo concurrence. Ante, at 6–7. There, he rejected themajority’s suggestion that a slight touching qualifies as the “useof physical force” even under §922(g). 572 U.S., at 173–175(opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Thecommon-law battery standard, he said, plays no role in a statutethat does not reference it. Id., at 176. Instead, the authorof Johnson explained that he read the phrase “physicalforce” in both §922(g) and §924(e) to mean what Johnson saidit means: “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physicalpain or injury.” 572 U.S., at 174 (quoting Johnson,559 U.S., at 140) (emphasis deleted). Even so, Justice Scaliaconcurred in the judgment because the state statute at issue inCastleman required proof that the defendant “cause[d] bodilyinjury,” and, in his view, “it is impossible to cause bodilyinjury” without employing the kind of violent force Johnsondiscussed. 572 U.S., at 174.That syllogism is of no use to the Court here.Justice Scalia may have claimed that a defendant whoseactions cause bodily injury necessarily uses violentphysical force. Ibid. But he did not claim that a defendantwhose failure to act causes bodily injury also necessarilyuses violent physical force. Quite the opposite. “[N]onphysicalconduct” like “acts of omission,” Justice Scalia said, cannot“possibly be relevant to the meaning of a statute requiring‘physical force.’” Id., at 181 (emphasis deleted; someinternal quotation marks omitted). By rejecting the notion thatomissions resulting in bodily injury can give rise to liabilityunder statutes like the one before us, Justice Scalia stuck to hisview in Johnson that the phrase “use ... ofphysical force” captures only “‘a category of violent,active crimes.’” 559 U.S., at 140 (quotingLeocal, 543 U.S., at 11; emphasis added). And it is aview directly at odds with the Court’s decision today.Finding Castleman a dry hole, the Courtprospects Stokeling. Ante, at 7–8. But the Court does soonly briefly, and understandably so. Stokeling held that thephrase “physical force” in §924(e) “includes the amount of forcenecessary to overcome a [robbery] victim’s resistance.” 586U.S., at 87. That amount of force, the Court explained, doesnot encompass “the merest touching,” id., at 83, or simply“snatching of property from another,” id., at 86, butrequires more “physical contact,” id., at 83. How any ofthat helps the Court today mystifies. Our case does not present aquestion about robbery or purse snatching, and nothing inStokeling begins to address the question whether a crime ofomission entails the “use... of physical force.”More than that, Stokeling’s statements about the degree offorce required to satisfy §924(e) indicate that something beyondmere inaction is required.[3]IIIUnable to ground its decision in precedent,the Court retreats, at the tail end of its opinion, to an argumentabout statutory purpose. Ante, at 10–11. The argument runsthis way. The Court observes that some notable crimes at commonlaw, including murder and battery, required prosecutors to proveonly that the defendant, with a particular mens rea, causeda particular result (e.g., death or bodily injury),whether by affirmative action or by failing to fulfill a legal dutythat required him to act. Offenses like that are sometimes called“cause and result” crimes. See 1 LaFave & Scott §3.3,at283, 293–294. Many contemporary statutes, the New Yorkmurder statute before us among them, follow this common-lawpattern. And, on the Court’s theory, if §924(c)(3)(A) failed toreach significant cause-and-result crimes like murder and batterysimply because they can be committed by omission as well as by act,the statute would not adequately serve its purpose of addressing“crimes of violence.” Ante, at 11. I am not blind to theappeal of the argument, but I find it unpersuasive for a couplereasons.AFor one thing, there can be little doubt aboutwhat the argument is: a resort to unexpressed legislativeintentions. Congress, the Court insists, could not possiblyhave used the phrase “crime of violence” in §924(c)(3)(A) withoutintending to capture “prototypical” cause-and-result crimes, likemurder and battery, long recognized at common law. See ante,at 12.We have no business entertaining an argumentlike that. In §924(c)(3)(A), Congress did not ask us to plumb thelegislative mind or to do whatever it takes to ensure the statutereaches certain cause-and-result crimes familiar to the common law.Instead, Congress told us exactly what qualifies as a “crime ofviolence” for purposes of this law: an offense that has “as anelement” the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physicalforce.” §924(c)(3)(A). And, as this Court has often explained, whenCongress takes the trouble to supply an express definition, we areobliged to treat it as “virtually conclusive,” even—and perhapsespecially—if it “varies” from what we might otherwise understand(or wish) the definition to be. See Department of AgricultureRural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601U.S. 42, 59 (2024); Scalia & Garner 228 (“It is very rare thata defined meaning can be replaced with another permissible meaningof the word...”).The Court offers no persuasive answer to any ofthis. To be sure, the Court protests that it merely seeks to givevoice to the “conventional meaning” of the phrase “crime ofviolence.” Ante, at 14. But the Court’s focus on that phrasein isolation, followed by an insistence that it must capturecommon-law cause-and-result crimes like murder and battery—allwithout any serious attention to the express definition Congressgave us or so much contextual evidence about its meaning—leaveslittle room for doubt that purpose, not text, is in the driver’sseat today.In saying that much, I do not mean to suggestcourts may never look to the common law to inform statutory text.Sometimes, courts properly consider the common law wheninterpreting a term of art Congress has adapted from that “oldsoil.” See, e.g., Sekhar v. United States,570 U.S.729, 733 (2013). And, yes, we may sometimes resort to thecommon law when a statute leaves a gap (say, by failing to supply aburden of proof or the requisite mens rea). See,e.g., Morissette v. United States,342 U.S.246, 262 (1952).The trouble is, we have nothing like that here.Before us is an express statutory definition that bears noresemblance to traditional common-law terms and leaves no gap tofill. The Court does not claim otherwise. Nor could it, for we havebeen down this road before. In Johnson, the government askedthis Court to draw from common-law liability principles to informparallel statutory language in §924(e). The Court refused thatrequest because it threatened to generate only a “comical misfit.”559 U.S., at 145; see also Castleman, 572 U.S.,at 175 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“expansive common-law” principlescannot displace the “statutory text” of §924(e)).The same holds true here. By looking to thecommon law today, the Court produces a serious misfit. At commonlaw, an omission could give rise to liability for acause-and-result crime only if the defendant had a well-definedlegal duty to act (think of a doctor’s duty to his patient, or afather’s duty to his child). See 1 LaFave & Scott §3.3, at 283.Yet the Court’s reading of §924(c)(3)(A) renders the presence of alegal duty irrelevant—as the Court sees it, knowingly orintentionally causing bodily injury by failing to act isalways a “crime of violence.” Ante, at 4. In the nameof revising this statute to better track common-lawcause-and-result crimes, then, the Court (ironically) expands thefrontiers of criminal liability in ways utterly unknown to thecommon law.Along the way, the Court hands us anothermisfit, too, this one having to do with our own precedents. InJohnson, the government asked the Court to read the phrase“physical force” in a statute addressing “violent felon[ies]” toreach mere touchings consistent with the common law of battery. See559 U.S., at 140. Here, the government goes a step further,asking us to read the phrase “physical force” in a statuteaddressing “felony” “crimes of violence” to embrace common-lawcause-and-result crimes (including battery) where not even a meretouching is required. How the Court might reject the first requestand indulge the second poses quite the puzzle. If there is some wayto reconcile today’s decision with Johnson, the Court neverexplains what it might be.BNot only do we have no business guessing aboutunexpressed legislative intentions. Even were we to play that game,the Court’s intuition that Congress must have wanted §924(c)(3)(A)to reach “prototypical” cause-and-result crimes might well bewrong.Consider a little more closely the concern theCourt asks us to ascribe to Congress. The Court cannot reallysuppose that Congress wanted us to ensure that cause-and-resultcrimes committed by omission qualify as “crimes of violence” under§924(c)(3)(A). After all, omission offenses would trigger asentencing enhancement under §924(c)(1) only in the most unusualcircumstances. Just ask yourself: How would our spiteful lifeguard“us[e],” “carr[y],” or “posses[s]” a firearm during and in relationto his crime of inaction? §924(c)(1)(A).Really, the Court’s argument must rest on adifferent assumption. It must rest on a view that Congressimplicitly wanted §924(c)(1)’s sentencing enhancements to apply tocause-and-effect crimes, like Mr. Delligatti’s, where an individualuses, carries, or possesses a gun to commit a violent actthat causes bodily injury. Ante, at 10–11. To ensure that§924(c)(1) does its intended job of reaching those“prototypical” crimes of violence, the Court goes big. It asks usto accept the (implausible) notion that cause-and-result crimesresulting in bodily injury always, even when committed by omission,require the government to prove as an element “theuse... of physical force.” §924(c)(3)(A);ante, at 10.But even if Congress implicitly wanted§924(c)(1)’s sentencing enhancements to reach cause-and-resultcrimes that are committed by act and cause bodily harm, there is noreason to suppose Congress wanted us to mangle §924(c)(3)(A) to getthe job done. Recall that §924(c)(1)’s sentencing enhancementsapply to a “crime of violence” as that phrase is definedeither in the elements clause before us (§924(c)(3)(A))or in the residual clause (§924(c)(3)(B)). See Part I–C,supra. By its terms, the latter clause “sweeps morebroadly.” Davis, 588 U.S., at 467 (internal quotationmarks omitted). It does not require an examination of the elementsthe government must prove to secure a conviction, let alone demandthat those elements require proof of the use of physical force.Instead, the residual clause reaches offenses that, in “ordinary”cases, pose a “risk of physical injury.” Id., at 452(quoting §924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). And Congress might well have thoughtthe residual clause the more natural home for cause-and-resultcrimes like murder and battery, for even if those offenses do notrequire the government to prove as an element the use of physicalforce, as committed those offenses typically involve physical force(and certainly the risk of it).Equally, Congress might have had another idea inmind. Maybe Congress did not mean for §924(c)(1) to reach allmurder and battery offenses. Maybe Congress wanted §924(c)(1) toreach only those murder and battery offenses that require thegovernment to prove, as an element, the use of physical force—orthat, by their nature, involve a substantial risk of such force.After all, States write their criminal laws in different ways. And,doubtless, some states draft some murder and battery statutes tofocus on the degree of force a defendant uses, not just the resulthe brings about. Maybe Congress honed in on offenses like that, notall murder and battery crimes, because it thought those offensesespecially deserving of additional punishment. See, e.g., 18U.S.C. §1111(a) (murder involving the torture of achild).That possibility seems all the more likelybecause §924(c)(1)’s enhancements are not the be-all and end-all offederal sentencing. Even when §924(c)(1)’s enhancements do notapply, sentencing courts enjoy ample tools to ensure a defendant’spunishment fits his crime. And that’s nowhere truer than when itcomes to those who commit serious crimes like murder and battery.In this respect, Mr. Delligatti’s case is illustrative. Thedistrict court sentenced him to 25 years in prison—20 years for hisoffenses related to attempted murder, plus 5 additional years under§924(c). See Judgment in No. 15–491 (SDNY, Aug. 20, 2018), ECF Doc.729, p.3. But even without a §924(c) enhancement, theadvisory guidelines suggested, and the judge was free to impose, asentence of up to 28 years. See Sentencing Submission for UnitedStates, ECF Doc. 712, at 10–14; accord, App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a.The judge, too, was free to depart or vary from the recommendedguidelines range to impose an even harsher sentence had she deemedit appropriate. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(b).Nor would recognizing that §924(c)(3)(A) failsto reach Mr. Delligatti’s offense guarantee him some windfall.Doing so would leave the district court free, on remand, to imposeexactly the same sentence it did the first time around, or maybeeven a harsher one yet. See Dean v. United States,581 U.S. 62, 69 (2017). Nothing about Mr. Delligatti’s case isunique either. With or without a §924(c)(1) enhancement, thoseconvicted of serious offenses in our federal criminal justicesystem routinely face serious sentences and judges amply equippedwith the means to issue them.*In the end, the Court’s decision today comesup short on every count. It neglects §924(c)(3)(A)’s definitionalterms and their ordinary meaning. It ignores important contextualclues. It leans heavily on only two, ultimately unhelpful,precedents without addressing others. And it resorts to conjectureabout implicit congressional purposes that is unconvincing on itsown terms. To my mind, none of the Court’s arguments can overcomethe hard fact that crimes of omission do not involve the“use... of physical force against another.”Individuals like our lifeguard who commit offenses by omission mayface punishment under many other criminal laws, but §924(c)(3)(A)does not reach them. Even if a reasonable doubt remained about thatcommon-sense conclusion (I confess I harbor none), the rule oflenity would require us to reach the same result anyway. SeeBittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 101 (2023).For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.